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Abstract
I take an e¢ cient contracting approach to answer the question how much "job
protection" to o¤er employees, in particular those at the top of organizations. Given
their privileged information or formal authority, senior managers who are not given
such protection are likely to take opportunistic actions that make them less dispens-
able. The optimal employment contract trades o¤ the resulting ine¢ ciencies that
arise from such "self-made" job security with the reduced incentives and higher com-
pensation costs under explicit employment protection. One implication of the model
is that more senior managers, such as CEOs, should receive both higher rents and
more protection, e.g., through contracts that are explicitly not at-will or that specify
a longer duration.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, I solve for the optimal employment contract for an agent who must be
remunerated for working hard and who must be incentivized to take decisions in the
rms rather than only his own interest. The key novelty of the analysis is my interest
in an often overlooked feature of employment agreements, in particular for more senior
employees including CEOs: Contract provisions that o¤er (more) employment protection,
for instance through the explicit stipulation of contract duration.
My main empirical motivation is the recent empirical analysis of CEO employment
contracts in Schwab and Thomas (2006). They ask whether CEO contracts are di¤erent
from the standard "at-will" contracts used for lower-level employees and nd that CEOs
are not generally "at-will employees". CEOs agreements o¤er far more protection, in
particular through contracts for a denite term of years (almost 87% of all cases) and
additional rights at termination. Schwab and Thomas (2006, p. 233) conclude: "This is
quite di¤erent from the protections available to other workers, who are generally at-will
employees without contracts."
My key nding is that the optimal degree of such employment protection must be
chosen in light of the di¤erent tasks that an agent faces. In terms of expected compensation
costs, it is cheapest for the rm not to o¤er any such protection, as this reduces the agents
incentives to work hard. However, in my model this will negatively impact on the e¢ ciency
of decision making. In essence, the respective employee will then use his discretion to
take opportunistic actions (e.g., in the choice of rm or division strategy) that make
him less dispensable, thereby substituting explicit employment protecting for "self-made"
protection. Through such "self-made" employment protection, the agent protects himself
against dismissal or future wage cuts under the threat of dismissal.
The key implication of my model is that employees who have more discretion and
whose decisions have more impact on rm prots will be given both higher compensation,
including a higher rent above their market wage, and employment protection. In my
model, this is not the result of ine¢ cient contracting under a rigged system of governance,
where powerful insiders enrich themselves, but it is e¢ cient in light of the di¤erent weights
that are given to di¤erent tasks that employees perform.
My theoretical analysis, based on a simple agency model of multi-tasking, ties into
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a recent empirical literature that looks into the details of employment agreements, in
particular for CEOs. Importantly, for such senior managers legal provisions that protect
workers rights or also agreements with trade unions should all be less important. At
one extreme of the spectrum of employment agreements that I consider is a contract "at
will", for which I stipulate that at any point of time the rm can dismiss the respective
employee. This gives the rm a strong bargaining position in possible renegotiations.1
At the opposite extreme is a contract that o¤ers full employment protection, so that the
respective employee can resist any attempt to renegotiate his wage downwards under the
threat of ring. I also consider intermediate cases, where the degree of protection represents
a more gradual choice, as achieved, for instance, through contract duration and, thereby,
through the "penalty" that a rm would have to pay when dissolving an employment
agreement prematurely.2
Gillan, Hartzell, and Parrino (2009) provide another recent analysis of CEO employ-
ment agreements. Their focus is di¤erent from that of Schwab and Thomas (2006), as they
expand the sample to include those CEOs who had no explicit agreement. Their empirical
analysis is twofold, identifying both the determinants of when a contract is explicit and the
determinants of contract duration under explicit agreements. They interpret their nding
in terms of protecting employees from opportunistic behavior by the rm. Employees who
have more to loose when their agreements are altered unilaterally should obtain an explicit
contract or a contract with longer duration. My take is somewhat di¤erent, as I argue
that through such explicit employment protection the rm protects itself against oppor-
tunistic decisions that, in particular, a senior executive could take so as to make himself
less dispensable. The role of potential ine¢ ciencies is important. It ensures that the form
of the employment agreement is not driven alone by risk sharing motives, which may be
of less relevance for wealthy senior executives. In fact, I thus undertake my analysis under
the assumption of risk neutrality.
1[E]mployers and employees can avoid a possible charge of breach if they stick to the practice of
modifying terms only by mutual consent. ... Mutual agreement on modications of terms does not preclude
wage changes employees may agree to a wage cut if the alternative is being laid o¤(Malcomson (1997),
p. 1921). If the rm tries to renegotiate doewnards an employees compensation and if the employee
rejects the rms o¤er, the rm has two options. It can either continue employment or re the employee.
If employment is continued, the existing wage contract remains in place: [R]efusal of an o¤er by either
party followed by continued employment leaves the contract unchanged(Malcomson (1997), p. 1933).
2Verkerke (1995, p. 863) notes that, at least for the US, "courts in virtually every American jurisdiction
continue to presume that an indenite term employment contract is terminable at will by either party."
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I use a multi-task agency setting. Though this is in line with the seminal contribution
of Holmström and Milgrom (1991), a key di¤erence is that there is only one performance
measure, namely output. My focus is not on the determinants of incentive pay but, instead,
on a comparison of other contractual provisions relating to employment protection. This
is also the key di¤erence to other models of multi-tasking that take, similar to my paper, a
sequential structure, most notably Levitt and Snyder (1997), Lambert (1986), or Demski
and Sappington (1987).
I do not intend to review the vast literature on incentive pay. The "self-made" employ-
ment protection in my model is somewhat akin to the notion of "entrenchment" used in
several papers, such as Lambert and Larcker (1985), Knoeber (1985), Almazan and Suarez
(2003), or Inderst and Müller (2010). A key di¤erence is the comparison of di¤erent types
of employment agreements that I undertake in this paper. Finally, I borrow the notion of
at-will contracts, which o¤er no legal protection from the threat of dismissal, from earlier
contributions in the labor literature. In contrast to, for instance, the seminal papers by
Kahn and Huberman (1988) and Prendergast (1993), my focus is not on employer oppor-
tunism but, instead, on the opportunistic behavior of employees. In fact, in my model the
employee can protect himself against employer opportunism through making himself less
dispensable.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the baseline model.
Sections 3 and 4 derive the optimal contract under two di¤erent types of employment
agreements. Section 5 compares their performance. In Section 6 we introduce a more
gradual form of employment protection. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
I consider a single agent working for a principal. The agent could be the CEO of a rm,
in which case the principal would represent the interest of all owners. Alternatively, the
principal could be the companys headquarters dealing with a particular division manager,
or any senior manager dealing with a subordinate. I will be more specic about particular
applications and the respective empirical implications after presenting the key results.
Timing, Tasks, and Payo¤s. The model has the following time line. Initially, at t = 1,
the agent is hired. As noted above, the treatment of di¤erent compensation contracts at
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this stage will be key to our analysis. At the nal stage t = 4 all payo¤s are realized. I
presume that both the rm and the agent are risk neutral. I also abstract from discounting.
There are two interim periods. In t = 2 the agent has to perform two tasks, which I
specify next, while at t = 3 the compensation contract can be renegotiated, as is discussed
subsequently.
In t = 2, the agent has to exert e¤ort so as to nd ways how to make the rm more
protable. But he also has to exert discretion in determining whether to then change the
rms strategy or that of his business unit in this way, e.g., by introducing new products
or making changes to the internal organization. In what follows, to be specic, I will say
that the agent, rst, has the task to nd a new strategy and, second, must decide whether
to implement a new strategy, provided he was able to nd one.
Precisely, at the beginning of t = 2 the agent must exert unobservable e¤ort, which
comes at private disutility c > 0, to nd a new strategy. Without such e¤ort no new
strategy is available. Under the existing strategy, the rm realizes in t = 4 the payo¤
xh > 0 with probability 0 < q0 < 1, while with the residual probability, 1  q0, the payo¤
is xl < xh.3 Denote  = xh xl. A new strategy is described by the respective probability
q with which the high outcome xh, instead of xl, is realized. From an ex-ante perspective,
q 2 [0; 1] is drawn from the distribution function F (q) with everywhere strictly positive
density f(q) > 0. In t = 2 it is at rst privately learned by the agent.
At the end of period t = 2, provided that a new strategy is available, the agent can
decide whether to implement it or whether to stick to the existing strategy. The agents
strategy choice is not veriable, but for our subsequently introduced renegotiations (in
t = 3) it is assumed to be known by the rm until then. The payo¤ consequences of a
new strategy for the rm are obtained immediately from a comparison of q with q0. What
this entails for the agent, however, will be described next, as this depends crucially on the
respective compensation contract.
Dispensability of the Agent and Employment Relationship. In t = 3 the employ-
ment contract can be renegotiated, and the rm could also consider replacing the agent.
Likewise, the agent could leave the rm.
3The specication of only two payo¤ realizations is common in the literature and allows, rst, to obtain
explicit solutions for the optimal incentive contracts, and, second, to conduct a clear-cut comparative
analysis.
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When no new strategy was implemented, the agent is fully replacable. In this case, I
stipulate that when hiring a new agent, the rms protability in t = 3 would remain the
same (i.e., as captured by q0). Instead, when the agent has implemented a new strategy
in t = 2, then he becomes less dispensable. This is the key assumption in my model. For
ease of exposition, I stipulate that the agent is then fully indispensable, so that when he
is replaced after "his" new strategy was implemented, the likelihood of realizing the high
outcome xh goes down to zero.
The renegotiation in t = 3 is captured by a simple game. We grant the rm the right
to make a new o¤er at this stage. If this is rejected by the agent, then the rm can still
choose whether to optimally dismiss the agent, provided that the agents original contract
allows for such dismissal. For the game of renegotiation in t = 3, we stipulate that at this
point the rm knows the (non-veriable) protability of the chosen strategy.4
Employment Contracts. We thus come nally to the specication of the contract that
is o¤ered by the rm in t = 1. As noted in the Introduction, in my baseline analysis I
compare two di¤erent types of employment agreements. The rst is a contract at-will,
under which the agents principal, e.g., the board in case of a CEO, can decide to dismiss
the agent in t = 3. In this case, the renegotiation o¤er made by the rm in t = 3 becomes
important. The second is a contract that o¤ers the agent job protection. In particular, I
presently assume that this protection is complete in the sense that the agent can not be
dismissed against his will. In this case, the renegotiation o¤er made by the rm in t = 3
will become superuous.
In each case, apart from allowing or disallowing dismissal, the compensation contract
can be made contingent on the following outcomes. A contract can specify a base wage w,
that is paid unconditionally, and, in addition, a bonus b that is paid only in case the high
outcome (x = xh) is ultimately realized.
As a nal ingredient of the model, we stipulate that any employee, i.e., both the original
agent as well as a new hire, has a market wage of W  0.
4To be specic, for the subsequently obtained results we only need that the rm knows whether a new
strategy has been implemented or not. Still, observability (at t = 3) of the protability q shortens the
exhibition as then the analysis of the game of renegotiation is rather immediate.
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3 Contracting under Employment Protection
Recall that the presently considered contract does not give the rm the right to dismiss
the agent before the nal period t = 4. Still, period t = 3 could be important as there
the agent may decide to leave the rm, which makes the rm strictly worse o¤ when a
new strategy was implemented. In what follows, we rst solve the relaxed problem (for
the compensation o¤ered in t = 1), where this additional constraint is not considered. We
argue below and prove in Proposition 1 that the derived contract would then indeed satisfy
this constraint, as under this contract the agent never wants to leave the rm.
We next solve the game backwards. We rst solve for the agents strategy implemen-
tation problem at the end of t = 2. We then derive the agents incentives to exert e¤ort
at the beginning of period t = 2. Finally, we solve for the optimal compensation contract
o¤ered in t = 1. Note that throughout the paper we stipulate that the rm wants the
agent to exert e¤ort in t = 2. After Proposition 1 we provide a su¢ cient condition for
when this is indeed the case.
Incentive Problems. Dene the expected compensation conditional on the success
probability that the implemented strategy realizes:
w(q) = w + qb: (1)
If the agent has identied a new strategy with success probability q, in t = 2 he will
thus compare the respective expected compensation w(q) with the expected compensation
under the original strategy, w(q = q0). As long as b  0, so that the agent participates in
the rms success, the agent will thus optimally choose to implement the new strategy if
and only if q  q0. This is the rst-best decision rule. Hence, the agents decision is always
rst-best e¢ cient when b  0. That b  0 must hold in equilibrium follows next from the
agents second incentive problem of exerting e¤ort at the beginning of t = 2. Exerting
e¤ort so as to identify a new strategy is only optimal for the agent if the respective expected
payo¤
F (q0)w(q0) +
Z 1
q0
w(q)f(q)dq   c
does not fall below the expected payo¤ from shirking, w(q0). After rearranging terms, this
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is the case if
b
Z 1
q0
(q   q0) f(q)dq  c: (2)
That is, the incentive constraint requires the bonus b to be su¢ ciently large so that
there is a su¢ ciently large di¤erence between the expected compensation under a new
strategy and the expected compensation under the initial strategy. Note that expression
(2) already incorporates the agents subsequently optimal implementation decision, namely
to implement the new strategy only if the realized protability is not below that of the
initial strategy, q  q0.
Compensation Design. Denote for given q the rms expected payo¤ by
(q) = xl + q  w(q):
Recall now that we stipulate that the rm wants to incentivize e¤ort. Given that with
b  0 the implementation decision is always uniquely pinned down (to be e¢ cient), the
rms optimization problem can be described as follows. The rm chooses (w; b) so as to
maximize its expected prots
 = F (q0)(q0) +
Z 1
q0
(q)f(q)dq
subject to the incentive constraint (2), the agents ex-ante participation constraint
F (q0)w(q0) +
Z 1
q0
w(q)f(q)dq   c  W; (3)
and the limited liability constraint, which is w  0.
By optimality, the incentive constraint (2) must bind at an optimum, so that we can
set
b = bb = cR 1
q0
(q   q0) f(q)dq
: (4)
Consider now the participation constraint (3). Given that the agent has a market
wage ofW and given that he will incur private disutility c, in expectation the employment
agreement must thus promise the agent at leastW+c. If this is feasible, then by optimality
for the rm the base wage w is chosen so as to make the participation constraint just
binding. For this we rst rearrange the participation constraint (3) to obtain
[w + bq0] + b
Z 1
q0
(q   q0) f(q)dq  W + c:
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After substitution for b = bb, this yields at equality the specication
w = bw = W   q0cR 1
q0
(q   q0) f(q)dq
: (5)
This is, however, only feasible when bw  0. Otherwise, if bw < 0, it is optimal for the
rm to choose w as low as possible, w = 0, given that this reduces compensation costs
and does not a¤ect the agents incentives. In this case, i.e., if bw < 0, the agent obtains an
ex-ante rent equal to
R =
q0cR 1
q0
(q   q0) f(q)dq
 W: (6)
Proposition 1 If the employment agreement o¤ers the agent full protection, thereby en-
suring that compensation is not renegotiated at the interim period t = 3, the following
characterization applies. To incentivize e¤ort, the optimal bonus equals b = bb, as given by
(4). If
c
q0R 1
q0
(q   q0) f(q)dq
 W; (7)
the optimal base wage equals w = bw, as given by (5), and the agent does not realize a
positive rent. Otherwise, if condition (7) does not hold, the optimal base wage is w = 0,
and the agent realizes a strictly positive rent R > 0, as given by (6). The agents decision
rule is always rst-best e¢ cient: He implements a new strategy if and only if q  q0.
Proof. Given the derivation in the main text, it remains to check whether the contract is
feasible as the agent does not leave the rm in t = 3. To see this, note that when w = bw
and b = bb, we have w(q0) = W and w(q) > W for all q > q0, so that, as he makes his
optimal implementation choice, it is thus indeed always optimal for him to stay with the
rm. When he obtains a rent, as (7) does not hold, this holds a fortiori. Precisely, we then
have w(q0) > W and thus also w(q) > W for all q > q0. Q.E.D.
The characterization in Proposition 1 proves to be relatively standard. In essence, there
is no conict of interest along the second task of the agent, namely that of implementing
the best strategy. The residual incentive problem is then a standard moral hazard problem
(in e¤ort) under limited liability. If condition (7) does not hold, which is always the case
when the agents reservation value is su¢ ciently low, then the agent extracts a rent, which
increases the compensation cost for the rm.
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To conclude the characterization of the equilibrium when the agent receives job pro-
tection, it remains to ensure that the rm indeed wants to incentivize the agent to exert
e¤ort. Firm prots are given by
 = xl   w +
h
 bbi q0 + Z 1
q0
(q   q0) f(q)dq

when the agent is incentivized to exert e¤ort and by
0 = xl  W + q0;
otherwise. When condition (7) holds,   0 thus holds if
S := 
Z 1
q0
(q   q0) f(q)dq   c  0;
where S equals the total expected surplus from inducing e¤ort. Otherwise, when the agent
obtains a rent as (7) does not hold, the e¢ ciency gains must be su¢ cient so that it is still
worthwhile for the rm to induce e¤ort: S  R. One way to express this condition is in
terms of a lower boundary on the "upside" from success, :
  1R 1
q0
(q   q0) f(q)dq
"
c
 
1 +
q0R 1
q0
(q   q0) f(q)dq
!
 W
#
: (8)
To complete our characterization, we thus stipulate that (8) holds.
Finally, we conduct a comparative analysis in the agents rent and, thereby, in the
rms cost of compensation.
Corollary 1 The agents rent R and thus the rms cost of compensation are higher when
it is more costly to exert e¤ort (higher c) or when e¤ort is less likely to result in a new
strategy that is better than the rms present strategy. The latter holds when the likelihood of
success is higher under the present strategy (higher q0) or when a new strategy is less likely
to have success (F (q) decreases in the sense of strict First-Order Stochastic Dominance).
Proof. The assertions follow from the characterization of R in (6). Precisely, note rst
that
dR
dc
=
q0R 1
q0
(q   q0) f(q)dq
> 0;
dR
dq0
= c
R 1
q0
qf(q)dqhR 1
q0
(q   q0) f(q)dq
i2 > 0:
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The assertion regarding the distribution F (q) follows nally as, from partial integration
we have that Z 1
q0
(q   q0) f(q)dq = 1  q0  
Z 1
q0
F (q)dq
and as Fi(q) > Fj(q) for 0 < q < 1 when Fj dominates Fi in the sense of strict First-Order
Stochastic Dominance. Q.E.D.
4 Contracting under the Threat of Dismissal
In this Section, I consider an employment agreement that does not provide the agent with
job protection. Precisely, the agent can be red at t = 3. Though in equilibrium the agent
will not be red, the credible threat to do so will be used by the employer to keep down
the agents wage. Precisely, this happens through renegotiations in t = 3. But, of course,
the threat of ring must be credible to make such renegotiations e¤ective.
In contrast to the preceding analysis, where renegotiations were not of relevance, the
analysis of the game now starts (backwards) with period t = 3. Once the outcome of rene-
gotiations is characterized, I then turn again to an analysis of t = 2 (incentive problems)
and t = 1 (contract design).
Renegotiations in t = 3. Recall that at this stage the agent may or may not have im-
plemented a new strategy. This is observable by the employer (albeit not veriable).
When no new strategy was implemented, the agent is fully dispensable: He has not
made himself more valuable to the rm than any other "outsider" whom the rm would
bring in to replace the agent. Suppose that the original employment contract prescribes
w(q0) = w + bq0 > W . Clearly, in this case the rm would not nd it optimal to continue
employing the agent under this contract. Irrespective of whether the rm res the agent
or whether the rm makes an optimal take-it-or-leave-it o¤er at the renegotiation stage,
which promises exactly w(q0) = W , the agent thus realizesW .5 This is the key implication
of the threat of dismissal and the renegotiation that this allows in t = 3: A shirking agent
will always realize just the value of his outside option. But the same also applies to an
agent who has not shirked but who subsequently chose not to implement a new strategy.
5A straightforward way to break this indi¤erence for the rm would be to appeal to " costs of hiring
an outsider and letting " go to zero.
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The outcome is di¤erent when a new strategy was implemented. As this is the agents
"own" strategy, he has thereby made himself less dispensable. In particular, recall that
we have specied that with a new strategy only the incumbent agent can generate value
above xl: With a new agent, the rm would realize only q = 0, instead.
In principle, we now have several cases to distinguish, depending on the rms and the
agents optimal actions under the existing contract. When w(q) < W the agent would
leave the rm. Next, we must distinguish between whether the rm can make a credible
renegotiating o¤er or not. An o¤er that reduces the agents expected compensation is
credible whenever, following rejection, the rm would honour its threat to dismiss the
agent.6 The threat is only credible for given q whenever (q) < xl  W .
Lemma 1 Under an employment agreement that does not protect the agent from dismissal,
renegotiations in t = 3 lead to the following outcome:
i) When the agent did not implement a new strategy, his compensation will always equal
his market wage W .
ii) When the agent implemented a new strategy with protability q, the existing agreement
(w; b) remains in place if
w(q)  W and (q) < xl  W: (9)
Otherwise, the expected compensation is renegotiated to W .
Incentive Problems. According to Lemma 1 we would have to distinguish various cases
for the agents expected compensation when a new strategy was implemented. However,
we can shortcut the analysis considerably. What allows this to do is the observation that
the agent himself chooses optimally when to implement a new strategy. As without a new
strategy his compensation is always W , he will do so only when w(q)  W . The case
where the agent would strictly prefer to leave the rm after implementing a new strategy
can thus be ignored. Turn next to the second part in condition (9). Clearly, this holds
for all q whenever w  W . Suppose that w > W , in which case w(q) > W would hold
6Recall that we stipulated that at t = 3 also the rm knows the realized q. As will be shown later,
however, under the optimal compensation contract there will only be renegotiations when the agent shirks.
As there is thus no renegotiation for all q under which the new strategy is adopted, one can show that
the equilibrium outcome remains unchanged when, instead, the rm could not observe q under the new
strategy (so that an o¤er must be made under uncertainty).
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for all q, provided that b  0, so that the agent would want to choose the new strategy
regardless of the realization of q. Thus, in case the rm wants to incentivize the agent
also to make a judicious choice (in its own interest) when implementing the old or the
new strategy, w < W must hold. We rst assume that it is indeed optimal for the rm to
appropriately incentivize the agent along both tasks. Subsequently, we will again provide
su¢ cient conditions that ensure that the resulting rm prot is higher than otherwise.
With these observations, we restrict consideration to b > 0 and w < W . We can now
proceed to set up the agents incentive constraints. For the agents implementation task
at the end of t = 2, we obtain a unique cuto¤ q solving
q =
W   w
b
; (10)
so that the agent prefers to undertake the new strategy if and only if q  q. That q > 0
follows from W > w, while for completeness we set q = 1 when W   w > b, though this
case will not arise in equilibrium.
Turn now to the start of period t = 2, where the agent must exert e¤ort. Recall that
the agents compensation without a new strategy is simply his market wage W . He also
earns the market wage when he identied a strategy but chooses not to implement it,
which is the case if q  q. Otherwise, the agent is paid according to the contract (w; b).
After rearranging terms, the agent then nds it optimal to exert e¤ort if and only ifZ 1
q
[w(q) W ] f(q)dq  c: (11)
That is, the expected compensation conditional on that a new strategy is implemented
must su¢ ciently exceed the market wage W . Otherwise, it is not worthwhile for the agent
to undertake the respective e¤ort at cost c.
Compensation Design. At t = 1, the rm chooses a contract to maximize its ex-ante
prots, which are now
 =
Z 1
q
[(q)  w(q)] f(q)dq + F (q) [(q0) W ] : (12)
Note that we have already used here the agents optimal cuto¤ q, as given by (10), and
that without a new strategy the protability is given by the likelihood q0. The rms
program is thus to maximize  subject to the incentive constraint (11) and the constraint
that w  0.
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By optimality for the rm, the agents incentive constraint (11) will again bind. After
substitution into the rms objective function  in (12), this transforms to
 =
Z 1
q
!(q)f(q)dq + F (q)!(q0)  (W + c) (13)
where we use the conditional surplus function
!(q) = xl + q:
In words, the rm as the residual claimant would realize the highest possible prots
when the subsequent implementation cuto¤ q maximizes e¢ ciency. This is the case when
q = q0.
I ask rst when the (rst-best) outcome is feasible, so that the highest possible rm
prots can be realized. This holds when, using the cuto¤-rule (10),
q0 =
W   w
b
(14)
holds together with the binding incentive constraint (11), again evaluated at q = q0:Z 1
q0
[w(q) W ] f(q)dq = c: (15)
After substituting for w(), the two conditions (14) and (15) can be solved to obtain
for the (at-will) compensation contract the bonus b = bb, as obtained in (4), and the base
wage w = bw, as obtained in (5). We comment on the equivalence to the outcome with
job protection, at least in the present case, below, when we compare the two types of
employment contract. The choice of b = bb and w = bw together ensure, also under a
contract at-will, that the agent, rst, exerts e¤ort so as to generate a new strategy and,
second, implements the new strategy if and only if it is e¢ cient. The agent does not realize
an ex-ante rent in this case. He only realizes a compensation w(q) > W for all q > q,
while w(q = q0) = W , so that he indeed chooses the e¢ cient cuto¤-rule.
When the characterized (rst-best) contract stipulates that bw < 0, this is not feasible,
given the constraint that w  0. Thus, in this case the optimal (at-will) employment
agreement can not be made su¢ ciently steep. It is then optimal to choose the base wage
as low as possible, w = 0, and adjust the bonus b until the incentive constraint (11)
just binds. (The left-hand side of (11) is strictly increasing in b, taking into account also
the agents optimal adjustment of q.) Then, however, the resulting cuto¤ q will be
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ine¢ ciently low: q < q0. The compensation that the agent must obtain in expectation
so as to exert e¤ort in the rst place now distorts his decision whether to implement a
new strategy. So as to ensure himself the respective wage w(q), rather than being paid
only his market wage W , the agent ine¢ ciently often implements "his own" new strategy.
Put di¤erently, under the optimal at-will contract, which does not give him employment
protection, the agent will then opt for "self-made protection", namely by making himself
indispensable through implementing his own strategy.
Proposition 2 The unique optimal ("at-will") employment agreement, where the rm
retains the right of dismissal, is characterized as follows. If condition (7) holds, then the
agreement species a bonus b = bb and a base wage, as characterized in (4) and (5). In this
case, the agent exerts e¤ort and implements a new strategy if and only if this is e¢ cient:
q  q = q0. If (7) does not hold, the base wage is set as low as possible, w = 0, while
the optimal bonus b is set so that the incentive constraint (11) just binds. In this case,
the agent implements a new strategy ine¢ ciently often, q < q0, so as to thereby ensure
himself a higher compensation by making himself less dispensable.
Proof. Observe rst that if the rst best is feasible, which by construction implies that all
of the surplus goes to the rm, then it is indeed uniquely optimal to choose the respective
contract ( bw;bb). This is the case if condition (7) holds.
Suppose now that this does not hold. Observe rst that from optimality the incentive
constraint (11) must still hold with equality. If this was not the case, then the rm would
be better o¤ by adjusting the contract as follows. When still w > 0, then while leaving q
unchanged, the rm could adjust downwards both b and w, which would unambiguously
improve prots. When w = 0 and the incentive constraint is slack, which as (7) does not
hold implies that q < q0, the rm would be strictly better o¤ by adjusting b downwards,
which would also bring up q. If (7) does not hold, the optimal bonus, together with the
resulting cuto¤ q, thus uniquely solves
b =
cR 1
q(q   q)f(q)dq
(16)
together with (10) for q. From substituting now b = W=q, given that w = 0, we have for
q the requirement that
W
Z 1
q

q
q
  1

f(q)dq = c: (17)
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Q.E.D.
Comparative Analysis. Intuitively, the tension between the agents two tasks becomes
stronger as the rm must pay a higher expected compensation to elicit e¤ort, given that
c increases. Then, the higher expected compensation, as promised under a new strategy,
induces the agent to implement a new strategy more frequently, i.e., also for lower values
of q. Also, when the market wage is lower, which also represents the agents compensation
following renegotiations under the old strategy, the incentives for the agent to make himself
indispensable are higher, which pushes down q. For a third comparative result, all of which
are made formal in the proof of Corollary 1, suppose that it is a priori less likely that new
strategy is (highly) protable. To still incentivize the agent, the bonus must increase,
which once again distorts more his implementation choice.
Corollary 2 Under the optimal ("at-will") employment agreement, where the rm retains
the right of dismissal, the agents decision becomes more distorted (lower q) or, alterna-
tively, condition (7), which ensures that still q = q0, becomes stricter if:
i) it is more costly for the agent to exert e¤ort (higher c);
ii) e¤ort is less likely to result in a strategy that is better than the rms present strategy,
i.e., the likelihood of success is higher for the present strategy (higher q0) or a new strategy
is less likely to have success (F (q) decreases in the sense of strict First-Order Stochastic
Dominance);
iii) or incentives for the agent to make himself more indispensable are higher as his market
wage is lower (lower W ).
Proof. Consider rst condition (7). From the derivations in Corollary 1 it is immediate
that the constraint is relaxed when c decreases, q0 decreases, F (q) increases in the sense of
strict First-Order Stochastic Dominance. As W only inuences the right-hand side, also
this comparative analysis is immediate. We next consider the case where (7) does not
hold, so that q < q0.
When condition (7) does not hold, we conduct a comparative analysis of q. For the
comparative results in W and c note that the left-hand side of (17) is strictly increasing
in W and the right-hand side strictly increasing in c, while the left-hand side is strictly
decreasing in q. (We can also, given continuous di¤erentiability, apply the implicit func-
tion theorem.) Further, the left-hand side of (17) increases following a strict First-Order
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Stochastic Dominance shift in F (q), which follows asZ 1
q

q
q
  1

f(q)dq =
1  q
q
  1
q
Z 1
q
F (q)dq:
Finally, note that q0 does not a¤ect q, so that in this respect the assertion holds only
weakly. Q.E.D.
It remains to ask when it is indeed optimal for the rm to align interests along both
tasks. Clearly, we must consider only the alternative where the rm does not incentivize
e¤ort. (Note that the agent does not receive a rent under the contract characterized in
Proposition 2.) When (7) holds, the condition for when eliciting e¤ort is indeed optimal
is again S  0: The rst-best e¢ cient surplus must then be higher. When (7) does not
hold, so that q < q0, we must compare , as given in (13), to 0, which results in the
condition

Z 1
q
(q   q0) f(q)dq   c  0; (18)
where q is determined implicitly in Proposition 2 (equation (17)). As the di¤erence 
does not enter the derivation of q, condition (18) holds surely whenever this upside from
success is su¢ ciently. We assume that this is indeed the case, so that our characterization
of the optimal at-will contract applies.
Discussion. The focus of this paper is on a comparison of di¤erent employment agree-
ments that o¤er various degrees of job protection. Nevertheless, also the form of the
characterized (on-the-job) pay, (w; b), deserves some comments. Under the optimal at-will
contract, it is the threat of dismissal that disciplines the agent to undertake e¤ort so as to,
thereby, generate a new strategy. To satisfy the respective incentive constraint (11), the
contract (w; b) only has to generate a su¢ ciently high expected compensation. The form
of the compensation, namely incentive pay with b > 0, is, instead, dictated by the second
objective, namely to ensure that the agent does not undertake a new strategy ine¢ ciently
often.
5 Comparison
I now compare the employment agreements characterized in Propositions 1 and 2. The key
distinction is whether condition (7) holds or not. If it holds, then the rst-best contracts are
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feasible in both cases. Otherwise, we must compare the respective second-best oucomes.
First Best. As already noted, the respective condition when the rst best can be ob-
tained without leaving a rent to the agent is the same in both cases, i.e., expression (7).
In this case, also the choice of the base wage and that of the bonus are the same, namely
b = bb and w = bw. This is at rst remarkable, given that the incentive component serves
two di¤erent purposes under the two considered employment agreements. With employ-
ment protection, b = bb > 0 is necessary so as to induce the agent to exert e¤ort. With
an agreement at-will, b = bb > 0 serves the purpose of subsequently inducing an e¢ cient
strategy choice, while the threat of dismissal provides incentives for the agent to exert
e¤ort.
Second Best. When (7) does no longer hold, we must compare the second-best out-
comes. This comparison is at the heart of the present paper.
With employment protection, we know that always b = bb holds. Instead, when (7)
does not hold, the bonus is strictly higher under the at-will contract: b > bb. In both
cases, however, the base wage is still the same, as it is chosen as low as possible: w = 0.
Still, the employee is worse o¤ under the at-will contract. With positive probability he
will be forced to accept a downwards adjustment of his compensation, namely to W . As
a consequence, while under the at-will contract he does not receive a rent, the employee
realizes a strictly positive (ex-ante) rent R > 0 if he is protected against dismissal. The
drawback for the rm under an at-will contract is a loss in e¢ ciency, which equals
L = 
Z q0
q
(q0   q)f(q)dq:
With this at hands, the comparison of rm prots between the two alternative agree-
ments is straightforward. The rm strictly prefers the contract at-will if and only if L < R,
so that the loss in surplus is smaller than the rent that is left to the agent. Bringing out
this trade-o¤ is the key contribution of this paper. In what follows, we ask in terms of the
models primitives when either type of employment agreement performs better.
Implications. Note that the loss in surplus given q < q0 is strictly higher when there
is more at stake, as  is higher. Note also that the realized cuto¤ q does not depend
on . This is the case as the agent cares about the bonus but not about the rms
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upside. Also, the rent R under an at-will agreement is independent of . Consequently,
we can conclude that it is strictly optimal for the rm to protect the employee from
the threat of dismissal when  is su¢ ciently large. This key observation accords well
with the motivating discussion in the Introduction. Arguably, CEOs and other senior
executives are more likely to have discretion over decisions that have a large e¤ect on
rm prots. If these employees make ine¢ cient decisions so as to thereby generate "self-
made" protection, namely by making themselves less dispensable, then the loss in rm
prots far outweighs the benets that an at-will contract would o¤er in terms of a lower
compensation. Employees higher up in an organizations hierarchy should thus enjoy both
an additional "rent" (over and above their market wage) and contractual provisions that
protect them against dismissal.
From the observations in Corollary 1 and Corollary 2 we know that both the rent R
and the loss in surplus L are a¤ected in the same way by some of the key parameters of
the model. That is, both the agents rent under employment protection and the loss in
e¢ ciency under an at-will contract are higher when it becomes harder to incentivize the
agent to exert e¤ort (higher c, higher q0, FOSD decrease in F (q)). This holds, likewise, for
a variation in the agents market wage W . A decrease in W increases both the necessary
rent and the ine¢ ciency. That being said, there is one interesting di¤erence between the
two employment agreements. Suppose that the respective condition for the rst best (7)
is just not satised. By construction, the resulting loss in e¢ ciency is then still small.
More formally, the rst-order e¤ect from q < q0 is zero when we start from the e¢ cient
outcome. On the other hand, the rst-order e¤ect from an increase in the agents rent is
always strictly positive. To be more precise, we could consider, for instance, an increase
in e¤ort c, starting from the value at which, ceteris paribus, the rst-best condition is just
satised. Then, for small enough variations, we can unambiguously say that the at-will
contract dominates.
Proposition 3 The two types of employment agreements, as characterized in Propositions
1 and 2 compare as follows. When the rm can realize the maximum feasible prots as
(7) holds, then this is possible under either employment regime. Otherwise, the rm faces
a trade-o¤ between leaving the agent with a rent under employment protection (R > 0)
or facing ine¢ cient decisions under a contract at-will (L > 0). Employment protection
is always strictly better (with L > R) when the decision is su¢ ciently important as 
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is su¢ ciently large. On the other hand, the employment will always be at-will when the
resulting distortions remain su¢ ciently small, as then the rst-order e¤ect from a higher
rent dominates the respective e¤ect from second-best decision making.
Proof. The comparison when the rst best is feasible follows from the discussion in the
main text. This holds also for the comparative analysis in . Finally, for the case with
small distortions, I consider a marginal change starting from parameter values at which
condition (7) holds with equality. The analysis holds irrespective of the respective change
in parameters (i.e., an increase in c or q0, a decrease in F (q) in the sense of FOSD, or a
decrease in W ). I consider thus only a marginal increase in c. Then, we have from the
characterization in Proposition 2 that dL=dc = 0, given that we undertake the analysis at
q = q0. Instead, from Proposition 1 we have
dR
dc
=
cR 1
q0
(q   q0) f(q)dq
> 0:
Q.E.D.
6 Gradual Employment Protection.
The empirical literature that I discussed in the Introduction considers more gradual varia-
tions in employment protection (for senior executives and CEOs), such as the duration of
an employment agreement. The longer is the stipulated duration, the higher is the penalty
that the rm incurs when it dismisses an employee, given that it must compensate the
agent for the foregone compensation. Another possibility would be the use of severance
pay.
In what follows, I do not want to elaborate on the specicities of a particular way how
an employee is protected from the threat of dismissal. Therefore, I simply stipulate that
the rm incurs a penalty P , which accrues to the employee, when it res the employee.
The resulting extension of the analysis, where now P  0 constitutes an additional choice
variable, is straightforward, given our so far derived results.
The key di¤erence is now that renegotiations at t = 3 will leave the agent at least with
a compensation worth W + P . This is thus also what the agent can realize even when
shirking. Consequently, the agent now realizes a rent that is exactly equal to P . This is
costly for the rm, so that P > 0 is optimally chosen only if it has benets. These benets
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arise from more e¢ cient decision making (provided that the rst best is not feasible with
P = 0, as condition (7) holds). Through setting P > 0 while increasing the bonus b > 0,
the rm ensures that the employees incentives not to shirk remain intact, while the cuto¤
q is pushed up. (Note that w = 0 holds in this case.) Provided that the respective
program is quasiconcave (cf. the proof of Proposition 4), it is immediate to extend the
insights from Proposition 3 as follows.
Proposition 4 Suppose that the rm can grant employment protection more gradually,
namely through a "penalty" P  0 that it pays in case of a dismissal (e.g., through a
longer agreed contract duration). Then, the optimal value of P , which is also the agents
rent, is higher when the decision is more important as  is higher. Further, provided that
the rst best is not feasible as (7) does not hold, even under the optimal value of P the
agents decision is still ine¢ cient (L > 0 as q < q0.)
Proof. With P  0, the cuto¤ q is determined by
q =
M + P
b
; (19)
while it is equally straightforward to extend the incentive constraint (11) to obtainZ 1
q
[w(q) W   P ] f(q)dq  c: (20)
After substituting from (19) into the binding constraint (20), we still have that b is deter-
mined by (16). As P > 0 will only be chosen when condition (7) does not hold, so that
optimally w = 0, we have in analogy to expression (17) that q solves
(W + P )
Z 1
q

q
q
  1

f(q)dq = c: (21)
Finally, substituting the binding constraint (20) into rm prots , expression (13) extends
to
 =
Z 1
q
!(q)f(q)dq + F (q)!(q0)  (W + P + c) (22)
I now di¤erentiate  with respect to P while using dq=dP from implicit di¤erentiation
of (21). This yields the rst-order condition d
dP
= 0:
f(q)(q0   q) q

W + P
R 1
q(q   q)f(q)dqR 1
q qf(q)dq
= 1: (23)
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Note rst that this implies that q < q0, provided that this holds also for P = 0 as condition
(7) does not hold. Further, note that, for given P , q is independent of . When the
objective function is strictly quasiconcave, we can thus see from implicit di¤erentiation of
the rst-order condition (23) that dP=d > 0, implying also that dq=d > 0. Q.E.D.
7 Concluding Remarks
This paper is motivated by recent empirical ndings that document that, at least in some
jurisdictions, employees further up a rms hierarchy may not only enjoy higher pay, but
also more protection against dismissal. In my model, I combine two tasks that an agent
may perform: He has to exert e¤ort, as in a standard model of moral hazard, and he has
to exert discretion when making a decision in the rms interest.
My key comparative analysis is with respect to the importance of this decision, in terms
of gained or lost prots that a better or worse decision generates for the rm. In the baseline
analysis I compare two di¤erent forms of employment agreements. One agreement protects
the agent against dismissal and, thereby, against the employers attempts to renegotiate
down his compensation in the future under the threat of dismissal. Instead, under an "at-
will" agreement, no such protection is given to the agent. The key trade-o¤ between these
two arrangements is as follows. A contract at-will provides "cheaper" incentives for the
agent to work hard. Specically, I show that the agent then never receives a rent above his
market wage. Such a rent may, however, be paid under a contract that o¤ers employment
protection. With such protection, the incentives to work hard must arise exclusively from
the incentive component of the agents compensation. Instead, incentives to work hard
are provided from the threat of dismissal if the contract is at-will.
A contract at-will, while being "cheaper" at rst glance, has the drawback of leading
to less e¢ cient decisions. Ultimately, the agent is then induced to make opportunistic
decisions that make him less dispensable for the rm, thereby protecting him against
dismissal or, likewise, against a lower (renegotiated) compensation in the future. In other
words, the agent then substitutes for formal employment protection by creating "self-
made" protection through making it more costly for the rm to replace him. I identify
conditions when the losses in ine¢ ciency are more important than the gains due to a lower
compensation. In particular, this is the case when, as noted above, the decision is more
important. Then, the respective employee both receives a rent and additional employment
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protection.
My model is very stylized so as to isolate the trade-o¤ between rent extraction and
e¢ ciency in the simplest possible way. For this purpose, I have also abstracted from risk
aversion, for instance. As discussed above, there may be various ways how a rm can o¤er
employment protection more gradually, for instance through the length of a stipulated
contract duration. Again, I have only o¤ered a rst, stylized analysis of this. Future work
may add more structure to the model, so as to derive in more detail the jointly optimal
components of e¢ cient employment agreements, rather than focusing only on (incentive)
pay.
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